Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Rayo, Luis
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171939
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3780-3812
• 关键词: Career concerns; work hours; rat race; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; CONTRACTS; ECONOMICS; FIRMS

摘要

A principal specifies time paths of effort provision, task allocation, and knowledge transfer for a cash-constrained apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In the optimal contract the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and by working inefficiently hard. The apprentice can work on both knowledge-complementary and knowledge-independent tasks. We study the optimal time path of effort distortions and their impact on the knowledge transfer, and analyze the effect of regulatory limits on the length of apprenticeships and on how much effort apprentices are allowed to provide.