Is Inflation Default? The Role of Information in Debt Crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bassetto, Marco; Galli, Carlo
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170721
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3556-3584
• 关键词: rational-expectations equilibrium; currency crises; REGIME-CHANGE; global games; aggregation; POLICY; MODEL; multiplicity; COORDINATION; INVESTMENT

摘要

We study the information sensitivity of government debt denominated in domestic versus foreign currency: the former is subject to inflation risk and the latter to default. Default only affects sophisticated bond traders, whereas inflation concerns a larger and less informed group. Within a - two-period Bayesian trading game, differential information manifests itself in the secondary market, and we display conditions under which debt prices are more resilient to bad news even in the primary market, where only sophisticated players operate. Our results can explain debt prices across countries following the 2008 financial crisis, and also provide a theory of original sin.