Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170116
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 591-619
• 关键词: multimarket contact; tacit collusion; price; cartel

摘要

This paper studies equilibrium selection in the retail gasoline industry. We exploit a unique dataset that contains the universe of station-level prices for an urban market for 15 years, and that encompasses a coordinated equilibrium transition mid-sample. We uncover a gradual, three-year equilibrium transition, whereby dominant firms use price leadership and price experiments to create focal points that coordinate market prices, soften price competition, and enhance retail margins. Our results inform the theory of collusion, with particular relevance to the initiation of collusion and equilibrium selection. We also highlight new insights into merger policy and collusion detection strategies.