Incentivized Kidney Exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sonmez, Tayfun; Unver, M. Utku; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: Boston College; Deakin University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170950
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2198-2224
• 关键词: paired donation; LIVING DONORS; PARTICIPATION; compatibility; willingness; TRANSPLANTS; STABILITY

摘要

Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in deceased-donor queue. We analyze equity and welfare benefits of this scheme through a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange, both in terms of access to living-donor transplants and reduced competition for deceased-donor transplants.