The Dynamics of Motivated Beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zimmermann, Florian
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180728
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 337-363
• 关键词: ceo overconfidence; expectations; preferences; INFORMATION; utility; memory; image

摘要

A key question in the literature on motivated reasoning and self-deception is how motivated beliefs are sustained in the presence of feedback. In this paper, we explore dynamic motivated belief-patterns after feedback. We establish that positive-feedback has a persistent effect on beliefs. Negative feedback, instead, influences beliefs in the short run, but this effect fades over time. We-investigate the mechanisms of this dynamic pattern, and provide evidence for an asymmetry in the recall of feedback. Finally, we establish that, in line with theoretical accounts, incentives for belief accuracy-mitigate the role of motivated reasoning. (JEL C91, D83, D91)