Acquiring Information through Peers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herskovic, Bernard; Ramos, Joao
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Southern California; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181798
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2128-2152
• 关键词: social value; network formation; public-goods; COORDINATION; acquisition; MODEL; COMMUNICATION; periphery; core

摘要

We develop an endogenous network formation model, in which agents form connections to acquire information. Our model features complementarity in actions as agents care not only about accuracy of their decision-making but also about the actions of other agents. In equilibrium, the information structure is a hierarchical network, and, under weakly convex cost of forming links, the equilibrium network is core-periphery. Although agents are ex ante identical, there is ex post heterogeneity in payoffs and actions.