Online Privacy and Information Disclosure by Consumers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ichihashi, Shota
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181052
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 569-595
• 关键词: price-discrimination; monopoly; MARKET

摘要

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multiproduct seller, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. Although the consumer benefits from accurate recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the seller prefers to commit to not use information for pricing in order to encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the consumer, who could be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, total surplus may be lower if the seller can base prices on information. (JEL D11, D83, L81, M31)