Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levine, David K.; Mattozzi, Andrea
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170476
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3298-3314
• 关键词: participation; DEMOCRACY; CONFLICT; models; size

摘要

We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.