Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Colonnelli, Emanuele; Prem, Mounu; Teso, Edoardo
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Universidad del Rosario; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer20181491
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3071-3099
• 关键词: financial incentives; politicians; bureaucrats; connections; CHINA

摘要

In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997-2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.