The Selection of Talent: Experimental and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abebe, Girum; Caria, A. Stefano; Ortiz-Ospina, Esteban
• 署名单位: The World Bank; University of Warwick; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190586
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1757-1806
• 关键词: labor-market policies; field experiment; financial incentives; job search; RECRUITMENT; PSYCHOLOGY; inference; workers; models; BIAS

摘要

We study how search frictions in the labor market affect firms' ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. Estimates from a structural model suggest that the intervention is effective because the cost of making a job application is large, and positively correlated with jobseeker ability. We provide evidence that this positive correlation is driven by dynamic selection. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives.