Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2623-2659
• 关键词: insurance markets; asymmetric information; private information; common agency; COMPETITION; revelation; equilibria; provision; liquidity; auction

摘要

This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We first provide a general necessary and sufficient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprofitable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tariff making additional trades with an entrant unprofitable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we finally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets.