Digital Dystopia
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Tirole, Jean
署名单位:
Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
刊物名称:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0002-8282
DOI:
10.1257/aer.20201214
发表日期:
2021
页码:
2007-2048
关键词:
Social pressure
image
incentives
NORMS
摘要:
Autocratic regimes, democratic majorities, private platforms, and religious or professional organizations can achieve social control by managing the flow of information about individuals' behavior. Bundling the agents' political, organizational, or religious attitudes with information about their prosocial conduct makes them care about behaviors that they otherwise would not. The incorporation of the individuals' social graph in their social score further promotes soft control but destroys the social fabric. Both bundling and guilt by association are most effective in a society that has weak ties and is politically docile.