Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Waldinger, Daniel
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190516
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2660-2696
• 关键词: empirical-model; school choice; neighborhood; demand; program; tax

摘要

Public housing benefits are rationed through wait lists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using wait list data from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution.