An Experiment in Candidate Selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casey, Katherine; Kamara, Abou Bakarr; Meriggi, Niccolo F.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Wageningen University & Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200125
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1575-1612
• 关键词: political competition; Primary elections; party; clientelism; primaries; inference; QUALITY; MODEL

摘要

Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters' most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision.