When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in US Electricity Generation: Reply
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cicala, Steve
署名单位：
Tufts University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20201872
发表日期：
2021
页码：
1373-1381
关键词：
摘要：
The average effect of deregulatory policies on fuel prices at coal-fired power plants is strongly influenced by plants that were initially paying the highest prices for fuel. Primary sources document that these plants were locked into long-term, high-cost fuel contracts, and only secured market rates post-deregulation. While these plants' fuel costs were unusual, their response to deregulation was not: both coal- and gas-fired plants reduce fuel prices one-for-one with the amount they were initially paying above their neighbors' costs. Our understanding of deregulation is not improved by excluding those who stand to benefit most.