TIME HORIZON AND COOPERATION IN CONTINUOUS TIME

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bigoni, Maria; Casari, Marco; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• 署名单位: University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Stanford University; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA11380
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 587-616
• 关键词: repeated prisoners-dilemma; Infinitely repeated games; rational cooperation; repeated play; strategies; equilibrium; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We study social dilemmas in (quasi-) continuous-time experiments, comparing games with different durations and termination rules. We discover a stark qualitative contrast in behavior in continuous time as compared to previously studied behavior in discrete-time games: cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deterministic horizons than with stochastic ones, and end-game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them with experience. Analysis of individual strategies provides a basis for a simple reinforcement learning model that proves to be consistent with this evidence. An additional treatment lends further support to this explanation.