Dynamic Amnesty Programs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kapon, Sam
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211428
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 4041-4075
• 关键词: RED-ARMY; DESIGN; ARRIVALS; crime

摘要

A regulator faces a stream of agents engaged in crimes with stochas-tic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of punishments for criminals who report their crimes. In an optimal program, time variation in the returns from crime can generate time variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, after which the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime report always. (JEL D82, D86, K42)