Designing Deadlines
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Madsen, Erik
署名单位：
New York University
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0002-8282
DOI：
10.1257/aer.20200212
发表日期：
2022
页码：
963-997
关键词：
摘要：
I study how an organization should manage a project of uncertain scope, when it is advised by a privately informed expert who prefers to prolong his employment. The optimal long-term contract combines a deadline for project completion and incentive payments which decline as the deadline approaches. When the firm can additionally learn about the project's state from output, the optimal deadline exhibits variable sensitivity to output, with a hard deadline at the outset of the project and increasingly soft deadlines as the project's performance declines.