Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sweeting, Andrew; Jia, Dun; Hui, Shen; Yao, Xinlu
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20202016
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1311-1333
• 关键词: MARKET-STRUCTURE; experience; spillovers; equilibria; curve; games

摘要

We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition.