Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leshno, Jacob D.
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201111
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 3876-3910
• 关键词: assignment; time; uncertainty; allocation; DESIGN; CHOICE; QUEUE

摘要

This paper introduces a stylized model to capture distinctive features of waiting list allocation mechanisms. First, agents choose among items with associated expected wait times. Waiting times serve a sim-ilar role to that of monetary prices in directing agents' choices and rationing items. Second, the expected wait for an item is endoge-nously determined and randomly fluctuates over time. We evaluate welfare under these endogenously determined waiting times and find that waiting time fluctuations lead to misallocation and welfare loss. A simple randomized assignment policy can reduce misallocation and increase welfare.