Labor Market Power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berger, David; Herkenhoff, Kyle; Mongey, Simon
• 署名单位: Duke University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191521
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1147-1193
• 关键词: employer size; COMPETITION; monopsony; INVESTMENT; share; rise

摘要

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms' local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor's share of income between 1977 and 2013.