Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reny, Philip J.
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210240
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2025-2043
• 关键词: Stable sets; STABILITY

摘要

Stable matchings in school choice needn't be Pareto efficient and can leave thousands of students worse off than necessary. Call a matching mu priority-neutral if no matching can make any student whose priority is violated by mu better off without violating the pri-ority of some student who is made worse off. Call a matching priority-efficient if it is priority-neutral and Pareto efficient. We show that there is a unique priority-efficient matching and that it dom-inates every priority-neutral matching and every stable matching. Moreover,truth-telling is a maxmin optimal strategy for every stu-dent in the mechanism that selects the priority-efficient matching. (JEL C78, I21, I28)