A/B Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Georgiadis, George; Powell, Michael
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200732
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 267-303
• 关键词: limited-liability; moral hazard; incentives; provision; DYNAMICS; wages; work; pay

摘要

This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the question of how best to improve a status quo incentive contract, given a priori knowledge of the agent's monetary preferences. We assess the empirical relevance of this result using data from DellaVigna and Pope's (2018) study of a variety of incentive contracts. Finally, we discuss how our framework can be extended to incorporate additional considerations beyond those in the classic theory.