Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Akhtari, Mitra; Moreira, Diana; Trucco, Laura
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Davis; Amazon.com
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171867
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 442-493
• 关键词: regression discontinuity design; incentives; performance; patronage; teachers; poverty; GROWTH; REFORM; IMPACT; matter

摘要

We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05-0.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor's party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process.