Screening Inattentive Buyers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mensch, Jeffrey
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201098
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1949-1984
• 关键词: information acquisition; rational inattention; Optimal auctions; monopoly

摘要

Information plays a crucial role in mechanism design problems. A potential complication is that buyers may be inattentive, and so their information may endogenously and flexibly depend on the offered mechanism. I show that it is without loss of generality to consider contour mechanisms, which comprise triplets of allocation proba-bilities, prices, and beliefs, and are uniquely determined by a single such point. The mechanism design problem then reduces to Bayesian persuasion along the optimal contour. This reduction has significant implications for both the implementation of the optimal mechanism and the revenues that can be achieved. (JEL C11, D11, D82, D83)