A Road to Efficiency through Communication and Commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Avoyan, Ala; Ramos, Joao
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171014
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2355-2381
• 关键词: DYNAMIC VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION; Pre-play communication; coordination games; cheap talk; industrialization; common; time; mechanism; FAILURE; eastern

摘要

We experimentally examine the efficacy of a novel pre-play institution in a well-known coordination game-the minimum-effort game-in which coordination failures are robust and persistent phenomena. This new institution allows agents to communicate while incrementally committing to their words, leading to a distinct theoretical prediction: the efficient outcome is uniquely selected in the extended coordination game. We find that commitment-enhanced communication significantly increases subjects'payoffs and achieves higher efficiency levels than various nonbinding forms of communication. We further identify the key ingredients of the institution that are central to achieving such gains. (JEL C73, C92, D83)