The Common-Probability Auction Puzzler

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ngangoue, M. Kathleen; Schotter, Andrew
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191927
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1572-1599
• 关键词: winners curse; rich domain; laboratory experiments; hypothetical thinking; EXPERIENCED BIDDERS; 1st-price auctions; INFORMATION; MODEL; equilibrium; BEHAVIOR

摘要

This paper presents a puzzle in the behavior of experimental subjects in what we call common-probability auctions. In common-value auc-tions, uncertainty is defined over values, while in common-probability auctions, uncertainty is defined over probabilities. We find that in contrast to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auc-tions, bidding in strategically equivalent common-probability auc-tions is consistent with Nash equilibrium. To explain our results, we run treatments to identify whether this difference stems from the way subjects estimate the good's value in a competitive environment rather than the way they bid conditional on these valuations. We con-clude it is the former. (JEL C70, C90, D44, D81)