Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Designs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Greenberg, Kyle; Pathak, Parag a.; Sonmez, Tayfun
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211743
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1070-1106
• 关键词: AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION; school choice; CONTRACTS; STABILITY; mechanisms; salaries

摘要

We present a proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (Sonmez 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on stakeholders'desiderata with minimal interference. Four objectivesrespecting merit, increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust-guided reforms to the US Army's centralized branching process of cadets to military specialties since 2006. USMA's mechanism for the class of 2020 exacerbated challenges in implementing these objectives. Formulating the Army's desiderata as rigorous axioms, we analyze their implications. Under our minimalist approach to institution redesign, the Army's objectives uniquely identify a branching mechanism. Our design is now adopted at USMA and