The Price of Power: Costs of Political Corruption in Indian Electricity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mahadevan, Meera
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230248
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3314-3344
• 关键词: regression discontinuity design; WEST-BENGAL; RURAL ELECTRIFICATION; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; provision; state; determinants; manipulation; success; cycles

摘要

Politicians may target public goods to benefit their constituents, , at the expense of others. I study corruption in the context of Indian electricity and estimate the welfare consequences. Using new administrative billing data and close-election regression discontinuities, , I show that billed electricity consumption is lower for constituencies of the winning party by almost 40 percent, , while actual consumption, , measured by nighttime lights, , is higher. I document the covert way in which politicians subsidize constituents by manipulating bills. These actions have substantial welfare implications, , with an efficiency loss of US$0.9 billion, , leading to unreliable electricity supply and significant negative consequences for development.