Comparisons of Signals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brooks, Benjamin; Frankel, Alexander; Kamenica, Emir
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20230430
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2981-3006
• 关键词: information; persuasion; dominance

摘要

A signal is a description of an information source that specifies both its correlation with the state and its correlation with other signals. Extending Blackwell ( 1953 ) , we characterize when one signal is more valuable than another regardless of preferences and regardless of access to other signals. This comparison is equivalent to reveal- or-refine: every realization of the more valuable signal reveals the state or refines the realization of the less valuable signal. We also study other comparisons of signals, including sufficiency, martingale dominance, and Lehmann. Reveal-or-refine is also equivalent to making any of these comparisons robust to access to other signals. ( JEL C90, D82, D83) )