A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Glazer, Jacob; Rubinstein, Ariel
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Boston University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/669160
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1057-1082
• 关键词: Implementation; DESIGN

摘要

A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.