Competing for Consumer Inattention

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Rozen, Kareen
• 署名单位: Brown University; Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/677253
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1203-1234
• 关键词: price dispersion; MODEL; equilibrium; INFORMATION; EXISTENCE; games

摘要

Consumers purchase multiple types of goods but may be able to examine only a limited number of markets for the best price. We propose a simple model that captures these features, conveying new insights. A firm's price can deflect or draw attention to its market, and consequently, limited attention introduces a new dimension of cross-market competition. We characterize the equilibrium and show that having partially attentive consumers improves consumer welfare. With less attention, consumers are more likely to miss the best offers; but enhanced cross-market competition decreases average price paid, as leading firms try to stay under the consumers' radar.