Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Reed, Tristan; Robinson, James A.
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/674988
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 319-368
• 关键词: institutions; POLICY; COMPETITION; GOVERNMENT; DEMOCRACY

摘要

We study the effect of constraints on chiefs' power on economic outcomes, citizens' attitudes, and social capital. A paramount chief in Sierra Leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by British colonial authorities. In chiefdoms with fewer ruling families, chiefs face less political competition, and development outcomes are significantly worse today. Variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism. Paradoxically, with fewer ruling families, the institutions of chiefs' authority are more highly respected, and measured social capital is higher. We argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs.