A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Costinot, Arnaud; Lorenzoni, Guido; Werning, Ivan
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/674425
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 77-128
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; OPTIMUM TARIFFS; POLICY

摘要

We develop a theory of capital controls as dynamic terms-of-trade manipulation. We study an infinite-horizon endowment economy with two countries. One country chooses taxes on international capital flows in order to maximize the welfare of its representative agent, while the other country is passive. We show that a country growing faster than the rest of the world has incentives to promote domestic savings by taxing capital inflows or subsidizing capital outflows. Although our theory of capital controls emphasizes interest rate manipulation, the pattern of borrowing and lending, per se, is irrelevant.