Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions, and Enrollment in the College Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fu, Chao
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/675503
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 225-281
• 关键词: higher-education; multiple equilibria; affirmative-action; discrete response; models; games; constraints; attainment; selection; earnings

摘要

I develop and estimate a structural equilibrium model of the college market. Students, having heterogeneous abilities and preferences, make application decisions subject to uncertainty and application costs. Colleges, observing noisy measures of student ability, choose tuition and admissions policies to compete for better students. Tuition, applications, admissions, and enrollment are joint equilibrium outcomes. I estimate the model using the NLSY97 via a three-step procedure to deal with potential multiple equilibria. I use the model to examine the extent to which college enrollment can be increased by expanding college supply and to assess the importance of various measures of student ability.