Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pallais, Amanda; Sands, Emily Glassberg
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/688850
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1793-1828
• 关键词: labor-market outcomes; social networks; EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE; job; incentives; contacts; entry

摘要

Referred workers are more likely than nonreferred workers to be hired, all else equal. In three field experiments in an online labor market, we examine why. We find that referrals contain positive information about worker performance and persistence that is not contained in workers' observable characteristics. We also find that referrals perform particularly well when working directly with their referrers. However, we do not find evidence that referrals exert more effort because they believe their performance will affect their relationship with their referrer or their referrer's position at the firm.