Did Iraq cheat the United Nations? Underpricing, bribes, and the oil for food program
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hsieh, Chang-Tai; Moretti, Enrico
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0033-5533
DOI：
10.1093/qje/121.4.1211
发表日期：
2006
页码：
1211-1248
关键词：
摘要：
From 1997 through 2003, the UN Oil for Food Program allowed Iraq to export oil for humanitarian supplies. We hypothesize that Iraq deliberately set the price of its oil below market prices to solicit bribes from oil buyers. By comparing the price gap between Iraqi oil and its close substitutes during the Program to the gap prior to the Program, we find evidence of significant underpricing. Our central estimate suggests that Iraq collected $1.3 billion in bribes from underpricing its oil, or 2 percent of oil revenues. Underpricing is higher during periods of high volatility in oil markets-when detection is more difficult-but declines after the UN limited Iraq's ability to set the price of its oil.
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