Raising children to work hard: Altruism, work norms, and social insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lindbeck, Assar; Nyberg, Sten
• 署名单位: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/121.4.1473
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1473-1503
• 关键词: inter-vivos transfers; rotten-kid theorem; cultural transmission; attitudes; MODEL

摘要

Empirically, disincentive effects on work of generous welfare state arrangements tend to appear with a substantial time lag. One explanation is that norms concerning work and benefit dependency delay such effects. We model altruistic parents' economic incentives for instilling such work norms in their children. Anticipated economic support from parents may reduce work effort, and parental altruism makes threats to withdraw such support noncredible. Instilling norms mitigates this problem. However, generous social insurance arrangements tend to weaken parents' incentives to instill such norms in their children. We find empirical support for this prediction.