Games of Love and Hate

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv
• 署名单位: New York University; University of Warwick; Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1789-1825
• 关键词: Industrialization; equilibrium; THEOREM

摘要

A strategic situation with payoff-based externalities is one in which a player's payoff depends on her own action and others' payoffs. We place restrictions on the resulting interdependent utility system that generate a standard normal form, referred to as a game of love and hate. Our central theorem states that every equilibrium of a game of love and hate is Pareto optimal. While externalities are restricted to flow only through payoffs, there are no other constraints: they could be positive or negative or of varying sign. We examine the philosophical implications of the restrictions that underlie this theorem.