SUPERSTAR CEOs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Malmendier, Ulrike; Tate, Geoffrey
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1593
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1593-1638
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; acquisitions; firm

摘要

Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the United States follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of superstars enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the awards, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative.