REGULATION AND DISTRUST

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aghion, Philippe; Algan, Yann; Cahuc, Pierre; Shleifer, Andrei
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1015
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1015-1049
• 关键词: culture; MARKET

摘要

We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism.