Position Auctions with Consumer Search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Athey, Susan; Ellison, Glenn
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjr028
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1213-1270
• 关键词: information; internet; KEYWORDS; DESIGN

摘要

This article examines a model in which advertisers bid for sponsored-link positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.