The Logic of Political Violence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Besley, Timothy; Persson, Torsten
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjr025
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1411-1445
• 关键词: civil conflict; natural-resources; economic shocks; state capacity; FOREIGN-AID; repression; RISK

摘要

This article offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war. We formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one-sided or two-sided violence (repression or civil war). The model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war; and suggests a natural empirical approach. Exploiting only within-country variation in the data, we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid. As in the theory, these effects are only present where political institutions are noncohesive.