TAX ME IF YOU CAN! OPTIMAL NONLINEAR INCOME TAX BETWEEN COMPETING GOVERNMENTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lehmann, Etienne; Simula, Laurent; Trannoy, Alain
• 署名单位: Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Uppsala University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qju027
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1995-2030
• 关键词: taxable income; taxation; migration; elasticity

摘要

We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasi-linear in consumption. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium, extending the Diamond-Saez formula. We show that the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration (on which we lack empirical evidence) are crucial to derive the shape of optimal marginal income tax.