Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spiegler, Ran
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjw011
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1243-1290
• 关键词: model; equilibrium; INFORMATION; games

摘要

I present a framework for analyzing decision making under imperfect understanding of correlation structures and causal relations. A decision maker (DM) faces an objective long-run probability distribution p over several variables (including the action taken by previous DMs). The DM is characterized by a subjective causal model, represented by a directed acyclic graph over the set of variable labels. The DM attempts to fit this model to p, resulting in a subjective belief that distorts p by factorizing it according to the graph via the standard Bayesian network formula. As a result of this belief distortion, the DM's evaluation of actions can vary with their long-run frequencies. Accordingly, I define a personal equilibrium notion of individual behavior. The framework enables simple graphical representations of causal-attribution errors (such as coarseness or reverse causation), and provides tools for checking rationality properties of the DM's behavior. I demonstrate the framework's scope of applications with examples covering diverse areas, from demand for education to public policy. JEL Code: D03.