The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; Schindler, David; Schudy, Simeon
• 署名单位: University of Munich; Tilburg University; Ulm University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/729443
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2695-2747
• 关键词: social preferences; moral hazard; field; creativity; schemes; MARKET; BEHAVIORALIST; tournaments; motivation; selection

摘要

Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams' demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.