Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kapor, Adam; Karnani, Mohit; Neilson, Christopher
• 署名单位: Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/729068
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2346-2395
• 关键词: School choice; STABILITY; demand

摘要

We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges' (non)participation in Chile's centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy changes: the introduction of a large scholarship program and the inclusion of additional institutions, which raised the number of on-platform slots by approximately 40%. We first show that the expansion of the platform raised on-time graduation rates. We then develop and estimate a model of college applications, offers, wait lists, matriculation, and graduation. When the platform expands, welfare increases, and welfare, enrollment, and graduation rates are less sensitive to off-platform frictions. Gains are larger for students from lower-socioeconomic-status backgrounds.