TRANSPARENCY AND DELIBERATION WITHIN THE FOMC: A COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS APPROACH

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael; Prat, Andrea
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Oxford; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjx045
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 801-870
• 关键词: monetary-policy; US; preferences; reputation; committees

摘要

How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect monetary policy makers' deliberations? Theory predicts a positive discipline effect and negative conformity effect. We empirically explore these effects using a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 and computational linguistics algorithms. We first find large changes in communication patterns after transparency. We then propose a difference-in-differences approach inspired by the career concerns literature, and find evidence for both effects. Finally, we construct an influence measure that suggests the discipline effect dominates.