DOUBLE FOR NOTHING? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON AN UNCONDITIONAL TEACHER SALARY INCREASE IN INDONESIA

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Ree, Joppe; Muralidharan, Karthik; Pradhan, Menno; Rogers, Halsey
• 署名单位: The World Bank; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-5533
• DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjx040
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 993-1039
• 关键词: gift exchange; performance pay; School quality; education; field; countries; outcomes; returns; PRIVATE; INDIA

摘要

How does a large unconditional increase in salary affect the performance of incumbent employees in the public sector? We present experimental evidence on this question in the context of a policy change in Indonesia that led to a permanent doubling of teacher base salaries. Using a large-scale randomized experiment across a representative sample of Indonesian schools that accelerated this pay increase for teachers in treated schools, we find that the large pay increase significantly improved teachers' satisfaction with their income, reduced the incidence of teachers holding outside jobs, and reduced self-reported financial stress. Nevertheless, after two and three years, the increase in pay led to no improvement in student learning outcomes. The effects are precisely estimated, and we can rule out even modest positive impacts on test scores. Our results suggest that unconditional pay increases are unlikely to be an effective policy option for improving the effort and productivity of incumbent employees in public-sector settings.