Market Segmentation and Competition in Health Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dickstein, Michael J.; Ho, Kate; Mark, Nathaniel
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/725707
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 96-148
• 关键词: Adverse selection; plan choice

摘要

In the United States, households obtain health insurance through distinct market segments. To explore the economics of this segmentation, we consider the effects of pooling coverage provided through small employers and through individual marketplaces. We model households' demand for insurance and health care along with insurers' price setting to predict equilibrium choices and premiums. Applying our model to data from Oregon, we find that pooling can mitigate adverse selection in the individual market and benefit small group households without raising taxpayer costs. Our estimates provide insight into the effects of new regulations that allow employers to shift coverage to individual marketplaces.